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Abstract 
This paper examines the response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have 
criminal charges against them, within the framework of a simple analytical model which assumes 
that criminal charges give rise to some stigma amongst the electorate, and result in a negative 
effect on vote shares. Campaigning, the cost of which is borne from candidates’ wealth, helps a 
candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the “marginal” voter. A 
criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince voters 
of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal 
charges. We test the implications of the model using data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in 
India, and find support for all the implications of the model. Our  empirical results show that  
voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges; however, this negative effect is reduced if 
there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges; besides, the vote shares are 
positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates 
with criminal charges.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is now well-known that the nexus between Indian politicians and criminals has assumed 
alarming proportions. Roughly a fourth of the members of the current Lok Sabha (the lower 
house of the national parliament) face pending criminal charges.2 A similar situation prevails in 
the various state assemblies.  Many of the members of the national parliament or states 
assemblies have been indicted with serious charges including murder. Not surprisingly, this has 
attracted increasing attention in both the media as well as in academic research. It has also 
attracted official attention with the appointment of an independent commission to analyse the 
phenomenon and suggest remedial measures.3 
 It would be misleading to suggest that there is a complete absence of legal measures to 
prevent the influx of criminals into parliament and the state assemblies. In fact, the 
Representation of People’s Act, 1951 specifies that candidates will be barred from contesting an 
election on conviction by a court of Law. The period of disqualification is for six years from the 
date of conviction, or from the date of release from prison, depending on the severity of the 
charge. Unfortunately, this law hardly has any bite because of the well-known infirmities in the 
Indian judicial system. In particular, governments typically drag their feet when it comes to 
prosecuting “local elites”. Even when cases are registered, inordinate judicial delay implies that 
these cases drag on, seemingly indefinitely. 
 This is why the Election Commission had proposed in 2004 that the Representation of the 
People Act, 1951 should be amended to disqualify candidates accused of offences which carry 
sentences of five years or more as soon as a court deems that charges can be framed against the 
person. However, the Lok Sabha itself would be required to pass appropriate legislation to 
implement the Election Commission’s suggestion. Obviously, such legislation is against the 
interests of a large number of politicians, and so it is not surprising that the Election 
Commission’s proposal has not been implemented. 
A landmark judgement of the Supreme Court in 2002 required every candidate contesting 
state and national elections to submit a legal affidavit disclosing his or her personal educational, 
financial, and criminal records. The court also stipulated that wide publicity should be given to 
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the contents of the affidavits so that the electorate can take an informed decision about who to 
elect to the assemblies and parliaments. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s order does not seem 
to have had much impact in so far as the influx of legislators with criminal indictment is 
concerned.4 
The continuing entry of large numbers of candidates with criminal records into Indian 
legislatures raises several questions. First, why do parties nominate such candidates? Given the 
huge demand for party tickets, the nomination of candidates with criminal records suggests that 
such candidates must possess some electoral advantage. We discuss some hypotheses which 
have been suggested to explain this electoral advantage. Second, what is the economic effect of 
electing candidates with a criminal record?  Third, what is the response of voters to candidates 
who have reported that they have criminal charges against them?    
While the first two issues have been discussed in the literature, the third issue has not 
been scrutinised rigorously. A somewhat cursory look at the data by simply looking at the ratio 
of winning candidates to number of contesting candidates amongst the criminal and non-criminal 
groups suggests that criminal candidates have a higher probability of winning. Perhaps, this has 
given rise to the feeling that criminals have an electoral advantage. The following from Aidt et al 
(2011) is representative of the prevailing view:  “Criminals, we show, boast an extraordinary 
electoral advantage in India.”  
We examine this issue within the framework of an analytical model which assumes that 
criminal charges do give rise to some stigma amongst the electorate. This stigma has a negative 
effect on vote shares since voters are less likely to vote for candidates who have criminal charges 
levied against them. Campaigning, the cost of which is borne from candidates’ wealth, helps a 
candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the “marginal” voter. A 
criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince voters 
of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal 
charges. This is plausible since the candidates have not been convicted, but only charged with 
some criminal offence. We look at a Nash equilibrium of a game in which the only strategic 
variable is the amount of campaign expenditure.  
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We test the implications of this simple model using data for the 2009 Lok Sabha 
elections. We find that the data supports all the implications of the model. We briefly describe 
the  principal results. 
  First, voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges. That is, all else being equal, 
the vote share of  a candidate with criminal charges is lower than that of the one who does not 
have any such blemish. However, this negative effect is reduced if there are other candidates in 
the constituency with criminal charges. Notice that the  negative effect of criminal charges on 
vote shares seems to contradict the prevalent view that candidates with criminal charges have an 
electoral advantage.   
We do not have data on campaign expenditure of candidates. However, our model 
predicts that (i) the higher the wealth of a candidate, the greater will be his campaign 
expenditure, (ii) campaign expenditure has a positive effect on expected vote share, the marginal 
effect possibly differing across the two categories of candidates  - those with criminal charges, 
and those with an unblemished record. Putting these together, the model prediction is that 
expected vote shares should be positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect 
perhaps being different across the two categories of candidates. The regression results 
corroborate both conclusions. 
Since voters penalise candidates with criminal charges, why do political parties still 
nominate them when so many candidates without criminal charges fight to get their party’s 
nomination?  A plausible explanation starts from the premise that candidates facing the threat of 
criminal convictions are more keen to contest the elections. Their enthusiasm is easily explained. 
Apart from the usual benefits which accrue to all successful candidates, candidates with criminal 
indictments look forward to an additional benefit. In particular, successful candidates 
(particularly those belonging to parties in the government) can with high probability either use 
coercion or influence to ensure that the local administration does not pursue the case(s) against 
them with any vigour.  
Moreover, the data suggest that criminal candidates are wealthier than those without 
criminal charges.5 Also, they are probably willing to contribute a higher fraction of their wealth 
to the party, or perhaps they ask for less resources from the party. This simply reflects the higher 
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price or value that they place on a party ticket. So, criminal candidates  generate positive 
externalities to candidates of their own party since their additional contributions release party 
funds which can be used in  other constituencies. This explains why parties may nominate 
candidates with criminal backgrounds even if they are (partially) penalised at the polls. 
Several recent papers offer explanations of why parties choose candidates with a dubious 
background. Banerjee and Pande (2009) start with the observation that voters may have a 
preference for candidates belonging to their own ethnic group. This implies that a politician 
belonging to the ethnically dominant group in a constituency may win even if he is of lower 
quality. Banerjee and Pande (2009) assume that parties do want to select candidates of the best 
quality. However, the quality of candidates available to a party in any constituency is a random 
variable. They show that an increase in the relative size of the ethnically dominant group or an 
increase in voters’ preferences for candidates belonging to their own group can worsen the 
quality of the winning candidate. Banerjee and Pande test the predictions of their model by using 
panel data on politician quality in 102 jurisdictions in the state of Uttar Pradesh.6  
Of course, the Banerjee-Pande hypothesis does not explain why so many candidates with 
a criminal background contest elections. But, it does provide at least a partial explanation of why 
there is an increasing number of successful legislators  in state assemblies as well as the Lok 
Sabha with criminal background.  
Vaishnav (2011) studies elections to 28 state assemblies between 2003 and 2009. He 
finds that personal wealth of candidates is positively associated with criminal status where a 
candidate is defined to be a criminal if he has been charged with a “serious” crime. The basic 
result is subjected to a variety of robustness checks. This leads him to offer the same explanation 
that we have mentioned earlier - parties nominate criminal candidates simply because they 
contribute larger sums to the party coffers.   
Aidt. el al (2011) offer a theoretical model where they assume that criminal candidates 
have some electoral advantage, although parties also incur some reputational cost in nominating 
them. They “are agnostic about the sources of this advantage”, but speculate that the electoral 
advantage of criminals could arise because they can intimidate prospective voters of rival parties 
into staying away from the polls. Notice that this would imply voting turnout should be 
                                                          
6
 They measure a politician’s quality by his record of illegal and corrupt behaviour as identified in a field survey. 
6 
 
negatively correlated with number of criminals in a constituency. We show that this is not true in 
the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.  
So, parties face a trade-off between the reputational cost of nominating candidates with 
criminal charges and their electoral advantage. This trade-off implies that parties would be more 
willing to incur the reputational cost in constituencies which are likely to witness close contests 
since the electoral advantage is more attractive in these constituencies. Conversely, a party 
would be unlikely to field a tainted candidate in a constituency where the party is very likely to 
win. Similarly, candidates with criminal indictments are more likely to be fielded in 
constituencies where the cost is lower – for instance, in constituencies where voters are poorly 
informed about the characteristics of the contesting candidates. 
  These theoretical predictions are plausible enough given the specified model. 
Unfortunately, there are some questionable issues in their empirical exercise. Perhaps, the most 
problematic is that they use literacy as the proxy for the cost of fielding a tainted candidate. Their 
rationale for doing so is that illiterate voters are less likely to be aware of the criminal 
background of the contesting candidates. Even if this is accepted at face value, there are at least 
two problems with using literacy as an explanatory variable. First, the only available data on 
literacy is from the 2001 Census, although their electoral data are for the 2004 and 2009 Lok 
Sabha elections. Second, census data are available only for administrative districts which do not 
coincide with political constituencies. Clearly, literacy data at the constituency level for 2004 
and 2009 simply do not exist! 
Aidt et al measure competitiveness by the percentage difference between the vote shares 
of the winning candidate and her closest rival in the same election. This clearly raises serious 
endogeneity problems since the individual candidate characteristics (whether of criminal 
background or not) presumably has some influence on vote shares and hence on the measure of 
competitiveness used by the authors! 
Chemin (2008) studies state elections and observes that bureaucratic corruption is lower 
in constituencies which elect criminal representatives. He also finds that poverty is higher in 
these constituencies. However, the mechanisms through which these effects operate is not spelt 
out in any detail. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the theoretical framework is 
laid out and the testable hypotheses are spelt out. The econometric specification and the details 
on the data and the different data sources used in the paper are described in section 3. Results 
from the empirical exercise are discussed in section 4, and the last section concludes.   
 2.  The Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we outline a simple model of electoral competition which provides a 
rationalization for the regression equation(s) that we use in the paper. Before setting out the 
formal model, we briefly outline its basic features. Fix any constituency. Since we want to focus 
on how criminal charges affect the electoral fortunes of different candidates in the constituency, 
we do not consider how candidates choose their policy platforms. Instead, we assume that every 
candidate i in the constituency has a fixed policy or electoral platform.  An alternative 
interpretation is that policy platforms are chosen in the first stage.  Given the vector of policy 
platforms, candidates decide how much to spend on campaigning in the second stage.   The main 
focus of the theoretical model is on how candidates decide on the amount of campaign 
expenditure, and how this affects expected vote shares. 
Voters take into account the vector of policy platforms as well as candidate 
characteristics such as education, their past record in public service and party characteristics in 
deciding which candidate to support. A particular candidate characteristic that we will emphasize 
in the paper is criminal record. That is, some candidates may have a certain number of criminal 
charges levied against them. Such criminal charges result in some stigma associated to the 
candidates.7  
Campaign expenditures benefit candidates in two ways. First, campaigning helps each 
candidate to influence voters that his or her electoral platform and individual characteristics are 
superior to that of the rivals.  Second, candidates with criminal charges can campaign to 
convince voters that the charges leveled against them are baseless.8 Voters base their voting 
decisions on the policy platforms, as well as the stigma attached to the different candidates. 
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Finally, candidates choose the amount of campaign expenditure taking into account their 
expected vote share and its cost.  
We now describe the model in greater detail. 
Suppose there are n candidates in the constituency. For each candidate , the  
characteristics are given by (	, 
 ,) where 	 represents  's electoral  platform as well as all 
relevant individual characteristics other than criminal record,  
 is a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 if  is a “criminal” and 0 otherwise,  while  refer to the wealth of . Each 
candidate  has to decide on the amount of campaign expenditure, which is financed out of the 
candidate’s wealth. Let  denote the amount of expenditure of candidate  spent in order to 
convince the “marginal voter" to vote for him. Since all candidates participate in this activity, 
this resembles a contest. Let ℎ( , ) describe the extent to which candidate  is succesful in 
winning over marginal voters when he spends , while the campaign expenditure of others (for 
this purpose) is  =  , … . . , , , … . . Then, ℎ( , )  is a Tullock contest function. 
We assume that ℎ() is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function in  for all , and 
strictly decreasing in  . So, the higher the campaign expenditure of candidate , the larger is the 
expected number of votes that  can hope to win over. However, the marginal benefit of 
additional expenditure is decreasing in . On the other hand, campaigning by other candidates 
eats into the vote share of . Also, we assume that  
(1)      lim→
 ,

= ∞ 
and that ∑ ℎ = 0

	
 , where  =  , … … … . , . An example of such a function is 
ℎ =  

∑  − 1/ 
 
The criminal cases attract some stigma to . Tainted candidates can campaign in order to 
convince voters that the charges against him are politically motivated and baseless. Let  denote 
the level of expenditure incurred for this purpose. Then, letting (
 , )  denote the stigma 
attached to candidate , we assume that  is decreasing and strictly concave in . Also, we 
assume that  
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(2)      lim→

 ,

= −∞ 
and 
 
(3)    1 ,  > 0 for all  
So, all tainted candidates have an incentive to spend some strictly positive amount in reducing 
stigma, but they cannot wipe away the stigma completely. Of course, 0 ,  = 0 - no stigma 
is attached to candidates without any stigma. Such candidates will set  = 0. 
We assume that for all , total campaign expenditure cannot exceed the candidate wealth, so that 
 +  ≤ . Let 	 denote the vector of candidate platforms (	 , … … … . , 	). Similarly, 
, , 
, denote the corresponding vectors. Hence, the profile of candidate characteristics in the 
constituency is denoted (	, 
, , ,). 
Fix the profile of candidate characteristics (p, c, e, v, w). Candidate  's expected vote share  is 
 
(4)     	, 
, ,= 	 +  ℎ() - c,   +  ∑  ((c, )). 
 
 
Equation 4 has the following interpretation. Suppose no candidate has any criminal charges 
against them so that there is no stigma attached to any candidate. Also, assume first that no 
candidate does any campaigning. Then, (	) specifies i 's expected vote share corresponding to 
the vector of policy platforms 	 chosen by the competing candidates. Although we have not 
specified voters' behavior in detail, notice that  is very general. For instance, suppose P is the 
policy space, with voters' ideal points being distributed over P according to some distribution. 
Then, as in Downsian models of electoral competition, a voter will vote for the candidate whose 
policy platform is closest to his ideal point. Notice that we have made no assumption either about 
the structure of   P or the distribution of voters' ideal points. We assume that 
	 = 1


 
As we have remarked earlier, ℎ()  represents the expected increase in vote share due to 
campaigning.  
Suppose now that candidate  has criminal charge(s) levied against him. Then, the function  
comes into play. We assume that candidate 's stigma reduces his own expected vote share.  
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What is the effect on candidate i's expected vote share if some other candidate j has criminal 
charges instituted against him? Suppose first that candidate  is tainted. The fact that there are 
other candidate(s) with criminal charges lowers the stigma attached to , and this increases 's 
expected vote share. Also, since the stigma attached to  makes every other candidate seem 
“better" in the eyes of each voter, and so increases their vote share. Assume that 
 
(5)                           ((c , )) =  (c, ) 
Notice that for all ,  c ,  = ∑  (c , ). Since ∑ ℎ () = 0 and ∑ 	 = 1  , 
we have  
(6)                                   ∑ 	 = 1	
   
Each candidate's objective is to maximize expected vote share, net of the disutility associated 
with campaign expenditure. Let the disutility be represented by ( ,). We assume that 
 
(7)      (, )

> 0, 
(, )



> 0, 
(, )

< 0 
 
The latter assumption means that marginal disutility is decreasing in wealth. This is a reasonable 
assumption and mirrors the usual assumption of decreasing marginal utility of wealth.  
The only strategic variable for the candidates is the level of campaign expenditure. A Nash 
equilibrium is a vector (∗, ∗),  such that for each , 
 
(8)        (∗, ∗),   maximizes 	, 
, (, ∗ , (, ∗ )) − (,) 
 
Consider any tainted candidate . His choice of (∗, ∗) must satisfy the first order conditions. 
 
 
(9)      (,
∗ )

  = 
(
∗

∗, )


∗
 
(10) (	,
∗)

    =
(
∗

∗, )


∗
 
 
The term on the left hand side of equation 9 is the increase in expected vote share from 
additional campaign expenditure arising because candidate  is better able to convince voters that 
her policy platform is superior to that of others. So, the left hand side represents the marginal 
benefit arising from additional campaign expenditure. The right hand side is the marginal 
11 
 
disutility arising from additional campaign expenditure. So, the equation represents the familiar 
condition that marginal benefit should be equate to marginal disutility in equilibrium.   Equation 
10 is the requirement that expected marginal benefit from expenditure to reduce stigma must 
equal marginal disutility arising from additional campaign expenditure. 
These conditions follow because our assumptions on ℎ()   and 1 ,  ensure an interior 
equilibrium; that is, ∗ > 0 and ∗ > 0  for each tainted candidate. 
Candidates who have no criminal charges against them set ∗ = 0   and so the only relevant first-
order condition for them is equation 9. 
Given the assumptions we have made so far, a Nash equilibrium must exist. Moreover, for 
each (,) , there is a unique pair (,) solving ’s first order condition. Since each ’s best 
response is unique, there can only be pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
 
Lemma 1 : Consider any two candidates  and  such that 
 = 
 and  > . Then, at any 
Nash equilibrium ∗, ∗, ∗ > ∗.  Moreover, if 
 = 
 = 1, then ∗ > ∗ 
 
Proof : Choose ,  such that  
 = 
 and  > .  Suppose the lemma is wrong and that there is 
some Nash equilibrium where ∗ ≤ ∗.  From equations 9 and 10, and the fact that ℎ 
and 1 ,  are strictly concave, this implies that ∗ ≤ ∗. Then, 
ℎ(∗, ∗ )
  ≥
ℎ(∗, ∗ )
  
and  
(∗ + ∗,  )
 <
(∗ + ∗,  )
  
the latter following from equation 7 and  > . 
But, then either  or  is not satisfying the first order condition. 
A similar proof establishes that ∗ > ∗ when 
 = 
 = 1 
This contradiction establishes the lemma. 
We only have data on the wealth of candidates and not on their campaign expenditure. 
Fortunately, the previous lemma shows that there is a monotonically increasing relationship 
between wealth and campaign expenditure within each of the two category of candidates – that 
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is, the “tainted” candidates with criminal charges, and those who do not have any criminal 
charges.  This monotonic relationship is used to establish the following very simple proposition.  
Fix any Nash equilibrium (∗, ∗) corresponding to the exogenous vectors of 
characteristics(	, 
,). Let ∅∗ = (∅∗ , … . . , ∅∗ )denote the expected vote shares of the candidates 
at this Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition: The expected vote share vector ∅∗ satisfies the following 
 
(i) For any pair of candidates  and j, if  =  and 
 = 1, 
 = 0, then ∅∗ − ∅∗  >  	 −
(	)  . 
(ii) Ceteris paribus, criminal charges against candidate ’s rivals have a positive effect on ’s vote 
share. 
(iii) For any two candidates  and j , if 
 = 
 and  > , then ∅∗ − ∅∗  >  	 − (	) . 
 
Proof : (i) Consider two candidates  and  such that 
 = 1and  
 = 0. Also, assume 
that  =  . We first show that  
ℎ(∗)  >  ℎ(∗) 
To see this, we need to show that ∗ > ∗. Given the assumptions we have made, ∗ > 0 since 

 = 1. Suppose ∗ ≥ ∗. Then, given   =  ,  
(∗ + ∗,  )
∗ <
(∗,  )
∗  
But, 
ℎ(∗)
∗  <
ℎ(∗)
∗  
 
The latter two inequalities show that either  or  is not satisfying equation 9.  
Hence, ∗ > ∗ and so ℎ(∗)  >  ℎ(∗). Moreover, 1 , ∗ > 0, and so this too reduces 
's expected vote share. From equation 4, it follows that  
∅
∗ − ∅
∗  >  	 − (	) 
(ii) This follows straightaway from the specification of the model. If 
 = 1, then 
1 , ∗ > 0 and hence ((1 , ∗) > 0. 
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(iii) Suppose  >  and 
 = 
 , 	 = 	. Then, we know from lemma 1 that 
∗ > ∗ 
Moreover, if 
 = 
 = 1, then 
∗ > ∗ 
It follows straightaway from equation 4 that  
∅
∗ − ∅
∗  >  	 − (	) 
This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
We discuss briefly the implications of the proposition for our regression exercise. Consider part 
(i) of the proposition. Essentially, this says that once we have controlled for wealth and policy 
platforms, then expected vote share will be lower for a tainted candidate. We will attempt to 
verify this in the regression exercise by checking whether the criminal dummy has a negative 
coefficient9. The implication of part (ii) of the proposition is straightforward - the coefficient on 
the variable representing rival candidates with criminal charges should be positive. Finally, part 
(iii) requires that the coefficient on the wealth variable should be positive. Notice that the 
proposition leaves open the possibility that wealth has a differential impact on vote shares of 
tainted and non-tainted candidates. 
 
3. Econometric Specification and Data 
We derive our regression equation from the model in the previous section. We are interested 
in explaining the vote share of each candidate i. Our  model specifies that the vote share should 
depend negatively upon the dummy for criminal charges. Since the stigma attached to a tainted 
candidate is decreasing in the number of other tainted rivals, we also include the number of other 
candidates with charges within the constituency interacted with criminal charge dummy as an 
explanatory variable. The nature of the dependence of vote share on wealth is more nuanced. The 
wealth of candidate i himself should have a positive impact, while the wealth of other candidates 
should have a non-positive effect since vote shares add up to one. It therefore makes sense to use 
the relative wealth of candidate i as an explanatory variable. Morever, the wealth effect could 
differ across the two categories of candidates with criminal charges and those who do not. We 
accommodate this possibility by including wealth of the candidate interacted the dummy for 
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 In the theoretical model, the only determinants are (, , , 	). In the regression exercise, we will have additional controls. 
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criminal charges as an explanatory variable.  Finally, we include other candidate characteristics 
such as the level of education of the candidate, dummy for the incumbent candidates seeking 
reelection to Lok Sabha, and a dummy for the candidates contesting as members of the state 
incumbent party(ies) in the regression equation.   
Yi=α + βc Criminali + βw Relative Wealthi+ βcwCriminali * Wealthi +  γs Number of 
Candidates with Chargesi *Criminali+  βn Incumbencyi  + βns State Incumbenti  +  
βe Educationi + γ Constituency Fixed Effects + λ Party Fixed Effects + εi (11)  
The vote share that we want to explain takes value between 0 and 1 and thus is bounded between 
these limits. Thus we transform the variable by calculating the log odds ratio for vote share of 
each candidate and estimate the model by ordinary least squares, with heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors. The dependent variable  is thus calculated as log  
  .  In 
all our regressions we include constituency fixed effects and party fixed effects to control for 
omitted variables, such as the varying policy platforms of the candidates belonging to different 
political parties. In robustness tests, we include fixed effects varying over state-party 
combinations instead of the other fixed effects. 
We describe the data used in the paper and also discuss the broad patterns observed in the 
data.  Our empirical results are presented in the next section.  
In 2003,  the Supreme Court in India decreed that all candidates contesting an election for 
the Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, or state assemblies in India had to file an affidavit with the Election 
Commission of India containing information on their assets (and liabilities), criminal charges and 
education.  We derive the data on these variables directly from the affidavits of the candidates- 
these are available on the election commission’s website as well as from a website maintained by 
the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), http://myneta.info.  
The data on percent of votes obtained, age, and gender of the candidates are obtained 
from the election commission’s website. Information on candidate incumbency has been 
gathered using various sources including searching through reports in the newspapers or on 
various internet sites. We define a party as an incumbent in a state if it was in power in the state 
(or was a major coalition partner), from 2008 up to the elections in 2009. The state level 
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incumbency information has been put together using the information contained in various articles 
in the Economic and Political Weekly and elsewhere (see Appendices for details). The state level 
data on crime has been obtained from the National Crime Bureau Reports. Appendix A1 
provides the data sources from where the data on various variables have been obtained, while 
Appendix A2 provides the summary statistics of the variables. 
India has 28 states and 7 Union Territories (UTs) in all. Among the UTs, only Delhi has 
its proper local administration with its own Chief Minister, while the remaining UTs are 
administered by the center. Therefore, we include Delhi as a “state” in our sample while 
excluding the remaining six UTs from the analysis. We follow Gupta and Panagariya (2011) and 
exclude the eight northeastern states since they have a special status with deep involvement of 
the center in their development process, as well as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This leaves 
us with a total of 20 states including Delhi. These states account for 506 out of the total of 543 
parliamentary seats across the country.  
Using the data from the affidavits, we define five categories for the education status of 
the candidates, assigning them values from 0 to 4; 0 represents the lowest category and 4 the 
highest. Relative wealth is calculated as the ratio of the wealth of the candidate to  the average 
wealth of the rest of the candidates. In one set of regressions, we exclude all Independent 
candidates. In this case, relative wealth is calculated as the ratio of the  candidate’s wealth to the 
average wealth of the other non-Independent  candidates in the constituency. 
Each  candidate’s  affidavit  has to contain information on whether the candidate  faced 
any criminal charges, as well as the sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) under which the 
charges if any have been framed. In addition, the candidate has to declare whether he or she has 
ever been convicted. Thus, in principle, the data is available on the number of criminal cases that 
a candidate faces, the specific sections of the IPC under which the candidate faces these charges 
and whether the candidate has ever been convicted. The ADR further divides the  charges into 
the charges for serious and non serious offences, by examining the sections of the IPC under 
which the candidates face the charges.  The conviction rate of candidates facing charges is very 
low—out of the 1,155 candidates in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections who faced at least one 
criminal charge, only 15 candidates were convicted. 
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It is sometimes claimed that the data on criminal charges is misleading since the charges 
are sometimes initiated by political rivals. Moreover, some of the charges are associated with 
involvement in political activities. In order to clean the data of such “spurious” charges, we 
specify a value of one to the criminal dummy only when a candidate faces more than one charge.  
This adjustment takes care of some obvious cases of frivolous charges or charges arising out of 
political activities.10 Henceforth, we will use the term tainted candidate to denote a candidate 
who has two or more criminal charges against them. 
Consider now  the patterns of criminal charges across candidates, states, and parties, and 
at their correlates with other candidate specific factors for the 20 states that are included in our 
regression analysis. Table 1 shows that it is the national and recognized state parties which field 
a substantially higher proportion of tainted candidates. In fact, roughly one in seven candidates 
fielded by state parties have at least two criminal charges levied against them.  The 
corresponding number for national parties is over one in ten candidates. This, together with the 
fact that a substantially higher number of winning candidates come from the national and state 
parties, explains why the win-ratio (the ratio of the number of successful candidates to the 
number of contesting candidates) is substantially higher for tainted candidates. This is 
documented in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of constituencies by the number of candidates who faced 
at least two charges. On average, about 15 candidates contested the election in each constituency 
in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Despite the large number of candidates, an overwhelming 
number of constituencies - over 75 per cent – had no tainted candidates.  In other words, there 
was a concentration of tainted candidates in some constituencies. In fact,  states like Bihar, 
Jharkand, Kerala had  a concentration of tainted candidates. 
Table 4 shows that on average, tainted candidates were wealthier, more likely to be 
incumbents and obtained a much larger percent of the votes. Somewhat surprisingly, the average 
age and education level of tainted candidates is also higher. Indeed, the difference in averages of 
these variables are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
                                                          
10
 As robustness checks, we choose  alternative specifications where (i)  the criminal dummy takes value one if a 
candidate has three or more criminal charges; or (ii) the number of criminal charges instead of a criminal dummy is 
used as an explanatory variable. 
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4. Regression Results  
We have pointed out in the last section that tainted candidates have a higher win ratio. At 
first sight, this might suggest that voters  do not care at all about the criminal records of their 
elected representatives. This is misleading because of several reasons – tainted candidates are 
more likely to be nominated by established political parties,  and they have higher wealth. These 
are obvious factors which influence vote shares and hence the win ratio. So, a more detailed 
analysis is required because any conclusions can be drawn about the response of voters to tainted 
candidates. This provides a strong motivation for our regression exercise.  
We have two parallel sets of basic regressions. In the first, we estimate our regressions 
using the data for all candidates in the twenty states that we have included in our analysis. We 
then run the same regression on a smaller sample which includes  only the candidates affiliated 
with some political party,  thus dropping the observations for “Independent” candidates. We drop 
the Independent candidates since the majority of these candidates obtained only negligible vote 
shares.11 Almost all the results are invariant with respect to the two samples.   
Table 5 reports the basic regression results. Column I contains the results for our 
benchmark specification. In column II, we interact the crime level in states with the criminal 
dummy for the candidates in order to get some idea about how the level of criminality in the state 
affects voters’ attitudes to tainted candidates. For instance, voters in crime-prone states may be 
accustomed” to a certain level of crime. If this is the case, they may be ignore the criminal 
records of tainted candidates. Alternatively,  voters may be incensed at the level of crime, and 
this may make them “punish” tainted candidates.  Columns III and IV of the table correspond to 
columns I and II respectively, but when  the Independent candidates are dropped from the data.  
The variables we are particularly interested in are the criminal dummy variable, relative 
wealth, as well as the interaction of the criminal dummy with wealth and with the number of 
other candidates with criminal charges in the constituency. Table 5 shows that our results are 
remarkably consistent with the theoretical model of Section 2. Thus, the negative coefficient on 
the criminal dummy shows that tainted candidates lose vote share relative to the others. Relative 
                                                          
11
 There were 3825 independent candidates with an average vote share of about 0.80 percent. Only 10 Independent 
candidates won in the 2009 election. 
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wealth has a positive effect on vote shares. The coefficient of relative wealth interacted with the 
criminal charge dummy is positive, implying that the loss in vote share is smaller for a wealthier 
candidate. Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction between the number of other tainted 
candidates with criminal charges and the criminal dummy is positive and significant in the 
regressions for all the candidates. This implies that the stigma attached to being a tainted 
candidate declines if there are other tainted candidates in the constituency. 
Among other results, the education status of the candidates has a positive effect on vote 
share; and the stigma of criminal charges increases as the crime reported in the state increases. 
This suggests that voters in crime-prone states tend to punish tainted candidates. We also find 
that incumbency at the candidate level as well as at the party level in the state increases the vote 
share of the candidates.12 Most of these results are robust to the exclusion of Independent 
candidates from the sample. 
We now report on some robustness checks. Since the primary purpose of the paper is to 
throw light on voter response to tainted candidates,  we conduct a key robustness test by 
constructing the dummy for criminal charges in an alternative way. This dummy takes value 1 if 
the candidate faces at least three criminal charges (instead of two in the earlier specification), and 
zero otherwise. Construction of the dummy in this way reduces the possibility of labeling a 
candidate as tainted if the charges against him are politically motivated or perhaps arising from 
violations of the law while undertaking political activities. The specifications in different 
columns in Table 6 are exactly the same as in the previous table. The results are also 
qualitatively similar to the ones obtained earlier for most of the variables. The coefficients of the 
criminal dummy and the interaction between wealth and criminal dummy are however larger 
than before, thus indicating that the loss of vote share is larger for a candidate who faces three or 
more charges than for the candidates with at least two charges. For such candidates, additional 
wealth helps in reducing the stigma by a larger amount as well.  
Table 7 reports  some  robustness checks. Column I in Table 7 includes the interaction of 
state incumbent and criminal dummy, while  column II includes age and gender of the candidate 
                                                          
12
 Gupta and Panagariya (2011) also come to the same conclusion. Of course, the positive effect of incumbency may 
be due to the fact that the coalition of parties constituting the UPA retained power in 2009. There are other instances 
where the ruling party or coalition has been defeated in the election- in such cases, we would not expect to observe a 
positive effect of incumbency on vote shares.  
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in the regressions.  In column III, we replace the dummy for criminal charges by the number of 
criminal charges as an explanatory variable, using the latter with a logarithmic transformation.  
Similarly, we interact the logarithm of the  number of criminal charges against each candidate 
with the candidate’s wealth. Finally, in the last column we include the number of all candidates 
with criminal charges in a constituency rather than only against the top four candidates by vote 
share, interacted with the dummy for criminal candidates. 
The results  show that the  coefficients  of the main variables of interest—wealth or 
relative wealth, criminal dummy and the interaction of wealth and criminal dummy, retain their 
significance. The only variable which loses significance in some of the specifications is the 
interaction of the number of charges against other candidates with criminal dummy.  
Some other  robustness tests are reported in Table 8. In column I, relative wealth is 
calculated as the ratio of the candidate’s own wealth to the sum of the wealth of candidates who 
received at least 3 percent of the total votes. Similarly, the number of candidates with charges 
also includes the data for only these candidates. In column II we estimate the regressions using 
the data only for the constituencies reserved for candidates from the scheduled castes and 
schedule tribes.  In the next column we estimate the regressions only for the constituencies which 
are not reserved for the candidates of the schedules or scheduled tribes. In the last column we 
include a dummy for serious charges (which takes a value 1 if there are at least two charges 
against a candidates and the ADR identifies that at least one of the charges against the candidate 
is for a serious crime). Again all our main results hold— the criminal dummy has a negative 
coefficient, wealth or relative wealth has a positive coefficient, and the interaction of wealth and 
criminal dummy has a positive coefficient. The coefficient of other candidates with charges is 
mostly positive, but insignificant in some of the specifications.  
We have conducted two more robustness tests, but do not report the results. In one, we 
drop one state at a time and estimate our benchmark specification with the rest of the data. All of 
our results hold with minor variations in the coefficients or the significance levels.  This 
robustness test confirms that our results are not driven by any outlier state. Second we estimate 
regressions similar to those in Table 7 by eliminating the Independent candidates from the 
sample. The qualitative results remain unchanged. 
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These results seem to leave very little doubt that voters do punish tainted candidates – 
this conclusion remains true irrespective of the specification chosen by us, and also remains true 
when we leave Independents out of the regression exercise. However, this raises the obvious 
question. Why do political parties nominate so many tainted candidates when they have so many 
other aspiring candidates fighting for a party ticket?  As we have mentioned earlier, Aidt et al 
(2010) construct a theoretical model which assumes that tainted candidates have some electoral 
advantage which induces political parties to nominate them despite some reputational cost. They 
do not specify the nature of the electoral advantage, but mention in passing that it could be the 
power of criminal candidates to intimidate voters who are likely to vote for their rivals.  If this 
were the case, then one would expect  voter turnout to be lower the greater is the number of 
tainted candidates. Table 9 negates this hypothesis – the data seem to show no negative 
relationship between voter turnout and the number of tainted candidates in a constituency. 
An alternative hypothesis advanced by Vaishnav (2010) is that tainted candidates are 
wealthier. In fact, he find empirical support for this hypothesis in his data set which consists of 
elections in various state assemblies. As Table 10 shows, this seems to be true even in our 
sample. So, it seems plausible to argue that tainted candidates use their greater wealth to “buy” 
their tickets. They can use their wealth to campaign more intensively, and perhaps also 
contribute to party funds. Unfortunately, we have no data (other than the self-reported wealth of 
the candidates) to empirically verify any other  hypothesis.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
Our   main empirical results suggest that voters do punish candidates who have criminal 
charges against them.  However, these tainted candidates are able to overcome this electoral 
disadvantage because they have greater wealth, and wealth plays a significant role in increasing 
vote shares.   The most plausible channel through which wealth affects vote shares is of course 
through campaign expenditures, which are likely to be positively related to wealth. 
There is now a fair body of evidence suggesting that voters who have information about 
the corrupt ion of incumbent politicians do punish the latter.  For instance, Ferraz and Finan 
(2008) use detailed Brazilian electoral and audit data to show that new information about 
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political corruption reduces the probability of reelection for corrupt incumbents. Bobonis et al 
(2011)  find that publicly available pre-election municipal audits significantly reduce the level of 
corruption in Puerto Rican municipalities.  Closer home,  Banerjee et al (2011)  conclude, on the 
basis of a  field experiment  conducted before the Delhi state  legislative elections , that voters 
who had access to information  about incumbent performance   punished worse performing 
incumbents and those facing better quailed challengers – these incumbents then received  
significantly fewer votes.  
Our empirical results, along with this body of evidence suggests that it is important for  
voters to be better informed about candidate characteristics.   The mere requirement that 
candidates file affidavits with the Election Commission about their characteristics is of limited 
use if voters do not have access to this information.   Perhaps, the Election Commission needs to 
play a more active role in disseminating this information.   The Commission must also think 
seriously about enhancing the   existing ceilings on campaign expenditure since practically no 
candidate or party adheres to the current limits on expenditure.  However, the Commission must 
ensure that all candidates adhere to the enhanced (but realistic) ceiling.   This will then at least 
reduce the “wealth advantage” enjoyed by tainted politicians.  
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Appendix A1: Description and Data Sources of Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Percent of Votes 
Obtained 
Election 
Commission 
 
Age Election 
Commission 
In years  
Gender dummy Election 
Commission 
Dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate is a female 
Wealth Election 
Commission 
 
Education Index Election 
Commission 
The index takes a value 0 if the candidates has no 
formal education, 1 if he has formal education till 
grade 5; 2 if the education is up to high school; 3 if 
education is up to undergraduate; and 4 for 
education level higher than undergraduate, 
including a technical or professional degree.  
Criminal Dummy Election 
Commission and 
Association for 
Democratic Reforms 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate has 2 or 
more criminal cases against him, and zero 
otherwise.  
Incumbent MP Various sources on 
the web 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate was a 
member of the previous Lok Sabha, and zero 
otherwise.  
State Incumbent Various sources on 
the web and 
different issues of 
Economic and 
Political Weekly 
The dummy takes a value 1 if the candidate belongs 
to a party which was in power in state government 
in 2008-09 before the Lok Sabha Elections. The 
state incumbent parties are: Andhra Pradesh, Indian 
National Congress (INC), TRS; Bihar: JDU, 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP); Chhattisgarh: BJP; 
Delhi: INC; Goa: INC, NCP; Gujarat: BJP; 
Himachal Pradesh: BJP; Haryana: INC; Kerala: CPI 
( Marxist), CPI; Maharashtra: INC, NCP; Madhya 
Pradesh: BJP; Orissa: Biju Janata Dal; Punjab: 
Siromani Akali Dal, BJP; Rajasthan: BJP; Tamil 
Nadu: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, INC; 
Uttarakhand: BJP; Uttar Pradesh: Bajuhan Samaj 
Party; West Bengal: CPI (Marxist), RSP; 
Karnataka: BJP; Jharkhand: JMM, BJP 
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Appendix A2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Observations Average Minimum Maximum 
Percent of Votes Obtained 7695 6.58 0.02 78.8 
Age 7694 45.76 25 88 
Gender Dummy 7695 0.07 0 1 
Wealth (1000s) log 7196 13.81 0.69 23.71 
Education Index 7017 2.58 0 4 
Criminal dummy 7676 0.07 0 1 
Incumbent MP 7695 0.05 0 1 
State incumbency 7695 0.07 0 1 
Cognizable Crime in state (per ‘000 of 
population) 
7695 1.73 0.05 11.62 
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Table 1: Candidates with Criminal Cases across Party Types 
Party Type  Number of 
Candidates 
Number of Candidates 
with least 2 Criminal 
Cases 
% of Candidates  
With at least 2 
Criminal Cases 
  I II III: (II/1)*100 
National Parties  1353 176 11.5 
State Parties  585 108 15.6 
Unrecognized Parties  1790 110 6.2 
Independent Candidates  3659 124 3.4 
    
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer  to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Contesting and Winning Candidates by the number of Criminal 
Cases 
Number of 
Criminal 
Cases 
Number of 
Candidates 
 
Number of 
Winning 
Candidates 
I II III 
0 6,551 349 
1 607 73 
2-4 382 57 
5-9 92 16 
>10 44 10 
Total 7676 506 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer  to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Candidates with Charges across Constituencies 
Number of candidates with 
at least two charges 
Number of 
constituencies 
0 206 
1 169 
2 83 
3 25 
4 14 
5 9 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1, data refers to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. 
 
 
 
Table 4: A Comparison of Variables for Candidates with and without Criminal Charges 
(at least two Criminal Charges) 
Criminal 
Dummy 
% votes Age Log Assets  
(in 1000s) 
Education 
Index 
Incumbent 
(percent) 
0 5.9 45.7 13.7 2.57 4 
1 15.4*** 47.2*** 15.1*** 2.71*** 10*** 
Total 6.59 45.8 13.81 2.58 5 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations using the data mentioned in Appendix A1; data refer  to the 
observations on twenty states included in the regressions. *** indicates that the values are significantly 
different from those for candidates with one or no charges at 1 percent level of significance. 
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Table 5: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates—Benchmark Specification  
 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in 
equation 8 and the variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text.  
  
 I II  III IV 
 Sample: All 
Candidates 
 Sample: No 
Independent Candidates 
Education 0.10*** 0.101***  0.14*** 0.142*** 
 [7.35] [7.39]  [5.92] [5.99] 
Wealth log*criminal dummy  0.097*** 0.095***  0.111*** 0.109*** 
 [4.00] [3.91]  [3.53] [3.44] 
Incumbent MP 0.842*** 0.839***  0.782*** 0.779*** 
 [9.62] [9.58]  [8.82] [8.78] 
Criminal Dummy  -1.27*** -1.12***  -1.415*** -1.19** 
 [3.59] [3.01]  [2.99] [2.43] 
Candidates with charges (among top 4)*criminal 
dummy  
0.24*** 0.23***  0.185** 0.165** 
 [4.38] [4.14]  [2.41] [2.13] 
Relative Wealth  0.003** 0.003**    
 [2.29] [2.28]    
State Incumbent 1.78*** 1.78***  1.755*** 1.75*** 
 [24.35] [24.30]  [24.36] [24.31] 
Cognizable crime in state*Criminal dummy   -0.072*   -0.104* 
  [1.94]   [1.91] 
Relative Wealth (no independent candidates)   0.006*** 0.001*** 
    [4.17] [4.12] 
Constituency Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6,732 6,732  3,621 3,621 
Adjusted R-squared 0.781 0.781  0.772 0.772 
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Table 6: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates—With an Alternative Criminal Charge 
Dummy  
 I II  III IV 
 All Candidates  No Independent 
Candidates 
Education 0.102*** 0.103***  0.144*** 0.145*** 
 [7.50] [7.53]  [6.08] [6.11] 
Wealth log*criminal dummy (more than 2 cases) 0.105*** 0.103***  0.137*** 0.136*** 
 [2.71] [2.66]  [3.39] [3.32] 
Incumbent MP 0.837*** 0.836***  0.781*** 0.780*** 
 [9.58] [9.55]  [8.81] [8.79] 
Criminal dummy (more than 2 cases) -1.378** -1.188*  -1.790*** -1.629** 
 [2.33] [1.90]  [2.81] [2.45] 
Candidates with charges (among top 4)*criminal 
dummy (more than 2 cases) 
0.271*** 0.250***  0.183* 0.167* 
 [3.68] [3.30]  [1.88] [1.68] 
Relative Wealth (absolute) 0.003** 0.003**    
 [2.27] [2.27]    
State Incumbent Party 1.808*** 1.805***  1.777*** 1.775*** 
 [24.53] [24.44]  [24.59] [24.47] 
Cognizable crime*Criminal dummy (more than 2 cases) -0.092   -0.083 
  [1.12]   [0.79] 
Relative Wealth (absolute, no independent candidates)   0.001*** 0.001*** 
    [3.86] [3.86] 
Constituency Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 6,732 6,732  3,621 3,621 
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.78  0.77 0.77 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in 
equation 8 and the variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text.  
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Table 7: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates: Robustness Tests  
(All Candidates) 
 I II III IV 
Criminal dummy -1.49*** -1.19***  -1.239*** 
 [4.07] [3.36]  [3.20] 
Wealth log*criminal dummy  0.115*** 0.092***  0.114*** 
 [4.54] [3.80]  [4.78] 
Incumbent MP 0.834*** 0.819*** 0.82*** 0.836*** 
 [9.53] [9.38] [9.42] [9.54] 
State Incumbency 1.872*** 1.785*** 1.81*** 1.793*** 
 [24.2] [24.4] [24.84] [24.51] 
Education 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.10*** 0.100*** 
 [7.29] [7.24] [7.44] [7.29] 
Candidates with charges (among top 4)*criminal dummy 0.264*** 0.240***   
 [4.77] [4.33]   
Relative wealth (wealth/average wealth of others) 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 [2.26] [2.27] [2.28] [2.31] 
State Incumbency*criminal dummy -0.56***    
 [3.47]    
Age  0.005***   
  [4.06]   
Gender  0.048   
  [0.92]   
Number of cases, log   -0.647**  
   [2.42]  
Wealth log*number of cases log   0.067***  
   [3.85]  
Number of cases against other candidates log* cases against the candidate log 0.064*  
   [1.72]  
Candidates with charges (all)*criminal dummy     0.038 
    [1.22] 
Constituency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 6,732 6,731 6,732 6,732 
Adjusted R-squared 0.782 0.782 0.78 0.781 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance 
respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. The regression equation is in equation 8 and the 
variables are defined in Appendix A1 and in the text. 
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Table 8: Explaining the Vote Share of Candidates: More Robustness Tests 
 
 I II III IV 
Criminal dummy  -1.13*** -1.894* -1.19*** -1.39*** 
 [2.99] [1.95] [2.86] [3.88] 
Wealth log*criminal dummy  0.112*** 0.146** 0.088*** 0.092*** 
 [4.64] [2.03] [3.18] [3.73] 
Candidates with charges (at least 3 percent vote 
share)*criminal dummy  
0.079    
 [1.39]    
Relative wealth (candidates with at least 3 percent 
vote share) 
0.011***    
 [3.85]    
Candidates with charges (among top 4)*criminal 
dummy 
 0.308* 0.24*** 0.25*** 
  [1.95] [3.85] [4.53] 
Relative wealth   0 0.003** 0.003** 
  [0.17] [2.41] [2.28] 
Incumbent MP 0.825*** 0.66*** 0.89*** 0.85*** 
 [9.39] [3.24] [8.6] [9.69] 
State incumbency 1.791*** 1.72*** 1.774*** 1.79*** 
 [24.58] [11.27] [20.63] [24.44] 
Education 0.10*** 0.146*** 0.083*** 0.10*** 
 [7.28] [5.12] [4.83] [7.36] 
Serious Crime Dummy    0.262** 
    [2.15] 
Constituency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Party Fixed Effects No No No No 
Observations 6717 2021 4711 6732 
Adjusted R-squared 0.781 0.764 0.786 0.782 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 9: Voter Turnout and the Number of Candidates with Criminal Charges 
(Dependent Variable: Voter Turnout) 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
Number of Candidates with at least two Charges 0.079 0.341 0.227   0.201 
 [0.28] [1.21] [0.79]   [0.72] 
Total Candidates  -0.23*** -0.24***   
-0.23*** 
  [4.14] [4.30]   [4.18] 
Number of Candidates with at least Two Charges from a Large Party  0.86** 1.00** -2.23*** 
    [2.08] [2.38] [2.85] 
Total Candidates from a Large Party     -0.579* 0.514 
     [1.86] [0.41] 
Dummy for a Constituency Reserved for SC Candidates   -2.25*** -1.25 -1.39*  
   [2.91] [1.65] [1.83]  
Dummy for a Constituency Reserved for ST Candidates   1.137 2.61** 2.74**  
   [0.94] [2.24] [2.31]  
Literacy      
-0.09** 
      [2.09] 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 506 506 506 506 506 506 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.788 0.792 0.784 0.785 0.794 
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Table 10 : Candidate Wealth and Criminal Dummy 
(Dependent Variable: Candidate wealth) 
 
 I II III IV V 
Criminal dummy 0.778*** 0.763*** 0.638*** 0.747*** 0.691*** 
 [7.55] [7.43] [6.23] [5.68] [5.87] 
Dummy for national party 2.58*** 2.07***   1.912*** 
 [42.70] [31.04]   [22.08] 
Dummy for state party 1.88*** 1.604***   1.402*** 
 [19.81] [17.32]   [12.92] 
Education  0.44*** 0.358*** 0.468*** 0.449*** 
  [17.34] [13.69] [8.82] [12.18] 
Incumbent candidate  1.14*** 0.876*** 1.09*** 1.04*** 
  [11.75] [8.47] [10.50] [10.72] 
Constituency fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Party fixed effects No No Yes No No 
Observations 7,177 6,737 6,733 2,077 3,633 
Adj. R-squared 0.251 0.305 0.374 0.213 0.289 
 
*,**, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of 
significance respectively. Robust t statistics are reported in parentheses 
